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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD PAULSEN, WILLARD K.
PAULSEN, NORMAN G. PAULSEX, doing business under the firm
name and stYle of PAULSEN
BROTHERS . CONSTRUCTION
CO~IPANY,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 7880

-vs.KEXXETH E. COOMBS and LAVERNE H. COOMBS, his wife,

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

Respondents are not in accord with the statement
of facts set forth in appellants' brief. The Statement of
Facts there appearing assumes the most important and
centroverted issue between the parties to be a proved
fact; namely, that the signed agreement, Exhibit A in
this action, expressed the true agreement of the parties.
With this we do not agree. We, therefore, submit our
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own statement of what we believe to be the proved facts
at the trial.
Arnold Paulsen Willard K. Paulsen and Norman
'
G. Paulsen, doing business as Paulsen Brothers Construction Company, a partnership, were licensed general
contractors in the State of Utah at all times pertinent
to this action. R. 37. Kenneth E. Coombs was engaged in
the real estate business at all times of interest herein.
R. 130. In September of 1950, in response to a telephone
call from Kenneth E. Coombs, Arnold Paulsen, one of the
respondents, went to the office of Mr. Coombs, located
on Highland Drive in the City of Salt Lake. 1\fr. and
Mrs. Coombs, appellants herein, met the respondent,
Arnold Paulsen, there and gave him a set of plans for
the construction of a house and asked him to figure the
carpenter labor in the construction of the said house. R.
38. l\1:r. Paulsen was asked only to submit a bid on the
carpenter labor. R. 39. He did submit a bid comprising
his estimate of the cost of the carpenter labor. R. 39.
The bid as submitted was in the amount of $5,500.00. R.
41. Mr. Paulsen wrote up on a slip of paper what was
included in the bid and left the slip of paper at the office
of Roy Johnson, the architect for Mr. and Mrs. Coombs.
R. 41. At no time was Mr. Paulsen asked by Mr. Coombs
to. bid upon or to furnish any materials for the job. R.
42; the bid submitted was for carpenter labor only, and
did· not include the swimming pool. R. 39, 60. Coombs
accepted the bid made by Paulsen and instructed him to
commence work on the construction of the house, which
Paulsen did on or about the 15th of October, 1950. R.
2
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-Hi. K_enneth E. Coombs aeted as his own general contractor. R. 40, 7:2. Smnetin1e after the work had been comInenced :Jlr. Paulsen received a call from 1\fr. Coombs and
went to the office of l\[r. Coombs, where a typewritten
contract wat' presented to him by Mr. Coombs, which
Paulsen identified from the witness chair as Exhibit
.. A" in tllis action, and Paulsen was asked to sign the
same. ..:-\.t no time did ~~ r. Coombs indicate to Paulsen
that there had been any change made in the written contract frmn the bid which l\Ir. Paulsen had submitted. R.
-1:2. The agree1nent was type\vritten by a stenographer
in the office of :Jir. Johnson, the architect for 1\fr.
Coombs. R. 65. l\Ir. Paulsen signed the agreement without reading the same, assuming that it was simply the
typewritten version of the bid he had submitted. R. 55.
Paulsen Brothers cmnpleted the job upon which their
bid was submitted, except for the installation of an item
of finish hardware, and Mr. Coomb's architect so testified. R. 6R The item of finish hardware not installed
was a special catch for the cupboard doors in the library
and this item of hardware was never made available for
installation though Paulsen went back several times to
install the same. R. 43 & 61. Though the job was completed, the final payment was never made to Paulsen
by Coombs in the amount of $1,375.00. Though the defendants and appellants admit the extra work claimed by
plaintiffs and respondents, the amount admitted to be
due to Paulsen for the extra work, $185.00, has never
been paid. R. 48. When Paulsen demanded the final payment called for under the contract, for the first time
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Coombs began to hedge and claimed that Paulsen was
supposed to have built a swimming pool and that Paulsen should give Coombs credit for the amount it would
cost to do the carpenter labor on the swimming pool.
R. 65. After having examined all the pleadings, having
heard the testimony of the witnesses and examined the
evidence introduced by the parties, the lower court found
for the plaintiffs and awarded judgment in accordance
with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. The defendants
appealed the judgment to this court.
Appellants in their brief dwell at great length on the
evidence introduced with respect to certain offsets clai.rned by the appellants against the respondents. In our
view of this case, this evidence is immaterial to the
basic issues involved and serves only to becloud the true
issues between the parties. An examination of the record
by the court will reveal many discrepancies between the
record and the interpretation of the record set forth
in appellants' brief under the Statement of Facts. The
same is true of the appellants' analysis of the pleadings
of the parties as set forth in the Statement of Facts.
We view these voluntary observations of appellants as
not only unnecessary to a consideration of this case, but
as being inserted solely to confuse the court. The proved
facts relative to this case are as we have stated them.
The pleadings of the parties speak for themselves and
are before this court for review and we therefore undertake no staten1ent of these pleadings as facts, but shall
reserve our comment thereon to the argument.
4
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STATE~[ENT

OF POINTS RELIED ON

The respondents do not find the orderly presentation of the position of respondents lends itself to the
discussion of the matters at issue in this appeal under the
same points as those relied upon by the appellants. The
court will find answered herein all of the contentions
of the appellants, but for the sake of a logical presentation we present our argument under our own selection
of points relied upon.

POINT I.
AN APPELLATE COURT WILL CONSIDER ONLY
QUESTIONS RAISED AND RESERVED IN THE LOWER
COURT. NO QUESTION WAS RAISED BY APPELLANTS
IN THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRETRIAL PROCEDURE OF THE LOWER COURT OR THE ALLOWANCE BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE FILING OF
ADDITIONAL PLEADINGS FOLLOWING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.

POINT II.
A WRITTEN CONTRACT MAY BE REFORMED BY THE
COURT TO EXPRESS THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES WHEN THE CONTRACT AS WRITTEN CONTAINS A MISTAKE IN EXPRESSION WHICH IS MUTUAL
TO THE PARTIES.

POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE
CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS AS AN EXHIBIT.

POINT IV.
A PARTY TO A CONTRACT CANNOT AT ONE AND
THE SAME TIME CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE CON-

5
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TRACT AND THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE SAME INSOFAR AS IT BENEFITS HIM AND CHOOSES TO IGNORE
THE CONTRACT INSOFAR AS IT LIMITS HIM, OR BINDS
HIM.

POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AN APPELLATE COURT WILL CONSIDER ONLY
QUESTIONS RAISED AND RESERVED IN THE LOWER
COURT. NO QUESTION WAS RAISED BY APPELLANTS
IN THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRETRIAL PROCEDURE OF THE LOWER COURT OR THE ALLOWANCE BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE FILING OF
ADDITIONAL PLEADINGS FOLLOWING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.

Under their Point III, the appellants discuss at great
length what they conceive to be an error on the part of
the trial court in not confining the issues on the trial to
the issues outlined in the "pre-trial agreement." That
the appellants should attempt to exploit the action of the
court which they themselves compelled and solicited in
behalf of their client, as ·an error, is indeed ironical.
A discussion of this matter calls for an analysis of
the pleadings filed .prior to the pre-trial conference, a
statement of what took place at the pre-trial conference,
and an analysis of what transpired on the day of trial.
Fortunately the pleadings are before this court for review. It is regrettable that the pre-trial conference is not
a matter of record so that the negotiations there con6
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ducted could be· impartially presented to this court for
review. As it is, we are dependent upon the frailties of
hmnan Ineinory for an account of what took place, which,
coupled with the natural inclination of advocates of a
client's cause to assume the construction on all statements and actions most favorable to their respective
clients, n1akes a completely unbiased and impartial stateInent of the matter difficult.
Let us first consider the pleadings of the parties.
The cmnplaint filed by plaintiffs and respondents R. 1-5
stated a claim based upon the written contract, Exhibit
"A," and a clai.In for "Extras." The theory of t~e complaint, as is clearly reflected by a reading of the same,
shows that the entire reliance of the plaintiff's was upon the plaintiff's having furnished carpenter labor under
the contract referred to in the complaint. No claim was
made by plaintiffs for any materials furnished. There
is no reference either in the relief prayed for in the com·
plaint or in the statement of the cause of action which
in any way indicates any attempt on the part of the
plaintiffs to recover for materials.
The theory of plaintiffs' case has been consistent
·from the beginning completely through the entire trial.
Plaintiffs contracted to furnish carpenter labor a11d
nothing more. They sought to collect for the carpenter
labor performed and nothing more. In the answer filed
by defendants and appellants herein, the execution of
the contract referred to in plaintiffs' complaint was admitted. No affirmative defenses of any character were
set forth therein and the only language which perhaps
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·~

should have served notice upon the plaintiffs that defendants' theory of the contract or construction of· the
contract was not the same as plaintiffs' was paragraph
6, wherein defendants denied the complete performance
of the "work" to be done by plaintiffs and denied that
plaintiffs performed all the "things" to be performed
by them. R 20. This rather vague language did not
awaken plaintiffs to the fact that the defendants were
claiming that the plaintiffs should have furnished not
only all of the materials used in the carpenter labor
under paragraph 6 of Exhibit "A," but steel kitchen cabinets, birch planters, and the like (R. 6), nor did it give
any indication whatever of the fact that defendants were
claiming that the contract in question covered the construction of a swimming pool. The Court's attention
is drawn to the fact that the defendants made no assertion of a counterclaim, did not assert any damages of any
kind and made no affirmative demand for setoffs. Under
this status of the pleadings, the pre~-trial conference was
held on March 25th, some five weeks following the filing
of the answer.
At the pre-trial conference defendants, through their
counsel, again asserted substantially the same defense
as claimed in the answer, there being no specification
by the defendants as to what it was they claimed plaintiffs had not done. It was stated by defendants' counsel
that one of the claims which they made was that Paulsen
should have furnished under the contract certain materials for the work done under paragraph 6 of the contract, but it was indicated that this was a minor matter;
8
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Plaintiffs pointed out to the court that it was plaintiffs'
position that they were not required by the agreement
to furnish the materials and that the parties had not
so contemplated at the ti1ne of the making of the agreement or at any time since until the controve,rsy in which
they now found themselves. Plaintiffs' counsel stated
that since the wording in the written agreement did seem
to include materials, that if counsel for the defendants
would state what materials they claimed should have
been furnished which were not, and what work had not
been done by plaintiffs that should have been done,
this might be a relatively easy way to determine the
real difference in terms of money between the parties,
and perhaps there would be no issues to be tried and
a settlement could be effected. It was pointed out to
the court and to counsel for the defendants that if the
issues were to be tried without the defendants first
specifying what they claimed under paragraph 6 of
their answer as the deficiencies in performance by plaintiffs, the trial could be cumbersome and lengthy because
it would then be the plaintiffs' burden to prove the performance of the entire contract, most of which was
already conceded to have been performed by the defendants, and that the real issues must of necessity be
then on only a few points. The court stated that in his
opinion this would be an expeditious means of getting
at the problem and he accordingly recommended, and
the recommendation was accepted, that the defendants
serve upon the plaintiffs a statement of what they clailned had not been performed by plaintiffs in the way of
9
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work under the contract, a statement of what materials
should have been furnished by plaintiff that had not
been furnished and that plaintiffs should then review
the same and see if an agreement on the matter could
not be· reached. The defendants' statement was to be
served on plaintiffs in ten days. Actually defendants
did not serve plaintiff with any statement of any kind
until Thursday, April 24th, preceding the trial on Monday, April 28th. At that time, instead of the statement
ordered by the Trial Court, plaintiffs were served with
a counterclaim setting up not merely some item of
materials claimed by defendants not to have been furnished or labor not performed, but an entirely new
theory of the case. Defendants, in their counterclaim,
claimed damages for improper performance of the work
required under the contract, and instead of a claim for
some 1naterials under paragraph 6 of the contract, which
it was claimed plaintiffs should have furnished and
did not, a claim was made that plaintiffs had failed
to furnish "cabinet work" as required under the defendants' interpretation of the contract, a vastly different
thing than some few materials which might have been
required of plaintiffs under the contract. Plaintiffs were
then charged for the first tim~ with not having constructed the swimming pool (R. 22-23). Instead of a
set-off of some few dollars over which it appeared, at
the pre-trial conference, there might be some difference
between the parties, the defendants now asserted a
counterclaim and set-off totalling $3,121.18, nearly twice
the relief demanded in plaintiffs' original complaint.

10
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The Inorning of the trial plaintiffs 1noved to dtny
defendants' 1notion to file the counterclailn as not having
been tinwly n1ade. That the court 'vas taken completely
by surprise by the action of the defendants at this late
date was rlearly indicated by the court's comment at
page 31 of the record where the court said, "I don't
recall any mention of a counterclaim at the time of the
pre-trial." And at page 32 where the court said, "What
gets 1ne is, this action was filed in January, and now you
come around with a counterclaim on the 22nd of April."
The court then made inquiry as to the length of tin1e
required to try the case, and asked counsel for plaintiffs
if the counterclaim was filed if counsel for plaintiffs
were prepared to try the issues on the counterclaim
(R. 33). Plaintiffs stated that they were. The court
thereupon perinitted the counterclaim· to be filed. Thereupon counsel for plaintiffs requested leave of court to
file a Reply to join issues on the counterclaim and at
this point 1fr. Hanson, counsel for defendants, said, "I
have no objection, your Honor." (R. 33).
Counsel for appellants thus led the trial court into
the trap by taking the case completely outside the issues
discussed at the pre-trial conference, waiving objection
to the filing of the reply by plaintiffs, making no objection to the court's failure to enter a written pre-trial
order. Now, after the trial of all the issues, the hearing
of plaintiffs' witnesses and defendants' witnesses and
the examination of all of the evidence introduced by the
parties, because the trial court entered judgment for
the plaintiffs, we now hear counsel for the defendants

11
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assert that the court's action constitutes error. Did
the trial court err in permitting defendants to file their
counterclaim setting up issues beyond those framed in
the pre-trial, and did the court then err in permitting
plaintiffs to file a reply countering these new issues and
setting up an affirmative defense thereto when no objection was ever made by counsel for defendants to the
filing of this reply~ Our answer is no ! The trial court
did not err; and if it did, defendants cannot now complain. Defendants made no objection to the filing of the
reply to their counterclaim. Defendants made no objection to the fact that the pre-trial order was not reduced
to writing. Can defendants now come and for the first
time on appeal complain after the decision is rendered,
of an act to which defendants consented at the trial?
The law in this regard is clear-they cannot.
American Jurisprudence makes a succinct statement
of the law which is almost universally accepted with
respect to this matter:
"The general rule, subject to certain limitations and exceptions hereinafter noted, is that
an appellate court will consider only such questions as were raised and reserved in the lower
court. This rule is based upon considerations of
practical necessity in the orderly administration
of the law and of fairness to the court and the
opposite party, and upon principles underlying
the doctrines of waiver and estoppeL Obviously
the ends of justice are served by the avoidance
of the delay and expense incident to appeals,
reversals, and new trials upon grounds of objection which might have been obviated or corrected
in the trial court if the que·stion had been raised.

12
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rrhere would be no assurance of any end to litig·ation if new objections eould be raised on
appeals. 'Yhere a party has the option to object
or not, as he sees fit, the failure to exercise the
option when the opportunity therefor presents
itself n1ust, in fairness to the court and to the
a<h-t'r~e party, be held either to constitute a
waiYer of the right to object, or to raise an
estoppel against the subsequent exercise thereof.
*~ * *" 3 ~\m. Jur. P. :Z5, Sec. :2-lG.
The doctrine announced above has been long accepted by this honorable court. 'V e call to the attention
of the court the case of Idaho State Bank vs. Hooper
Sugar Company, 7-l Utah 24, 276 P. 659. In that case
the appellant on appeal attempted for the first time
to raise a question of ambiguity in the complaint. It
will be noted that the situation in that case and in the
case before this court are indeed similar in that now
counsel for appellants in the case at hand is trying to
raise a claimed inconsistency between plaintiffs' complaint and plaintiffs' reply and assign as error the trial
court's action in permitting the reply to be filed. In
the case above cited the Supreme Court said:
"No question was raised in the trial court
that the cmnplaint is uncertain or ambiguous in
not alleging the kind of holde·r of the note plaintiff claimed to be. Such question is raised for
the first time in the brief filed on behalf of
Wright. In the absence of a timely attack upon
the complaint in such respect, 'Vright should not
be heard to complain about any ambiguity or
uncertainty of the complaint for the first time
in this court. * * *" Idaho State Bank vs. Hooper
Suga.r Company, 7-l Utah 24, 276 P. 659 at page
667.

13
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In the case of Flinders vs. Hunter, 60 Utah 314,
208 P. 526, the court considered a similar problem:
"No objection of any kind appears in the
record that defendant's answer was not verified;
nor was there any demurrer or objection interposed to the answer. While it is true that our
statute provides that if a complaint he verified
other pleadings in the action must also be verified, yet it is also true that either party may waive
strict compliance with the provisions of the
statute. In case an answer is not verified when
it should he the plaintiff may not go to trial
and make the objection that the answer lacked
verification for the first time in this court. By
pursuing such a course he waives the defect and
will not he heard to complain. Had he objected
in the court below at the proper tli11e and in a
proper manner, the defect could easily have been
cured by n1aking a verification, and in default
thereof the court could have stricken the answer.
Plaintiff's assignment in that regard must therefore fail."
We direct the court's attention to the fact that in
the instant case, had counsel for appellants objected
to. the filing of the reply, had counsel objected to the
failure of the court to enter a written pre-trial order,
the defect could have been easily and readily cured
at that time. He surely should not he heard to complain
for the first time in the Supreme Court.
The attitude of this court toward failure to make
obje-ction in the lower court and then raising the matter
on appeal for the first time is so well expressed in
Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, that we

14
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quote briefly fron1 this opinion at the expense of being
repetitious :
••:\[any other error~ are assigned, but they
are not referred to in appellants' brief; others
are argued in the brief but were not assigned;
others raise questions not presented in the court
l1elozc; and finally, others allege insufficiency of
the evidence to authorize a 1nodification of the
decree without specifying the particulars wherein the evidence is insufficient and without incorporating any of the evidence in the record.
"'Such mnissions and commissions on the part
of appellant are in disregard of the rules of practice of this court and have been condemned by
the decisions of the court in every case with
which we are familiar wherein the objection has
been seasonably made and relied on. To cite all
the cases so holding would require more space
than ought to be accorded an entire opinion
in an ordinary case. We cite a few, however, as
a gentle rerninder (cases cited)." (Italics ours).
Counsel for the appellants had ample opportunity
to object to the introduction of the Reply by the respondents. If he was taken by surprise, as he claims, by the
issues therein framed he had the right to then and there
call the matter to the attention of the trial court by q,n
appropriate objection. This he did not do. In view
of the citation from American Jurisprudence above
stated and the doctrine announced in the Utah cases,
we submit that with respect to Point III in appellants'
brief there is nothing before this court for review. If
counsel for appellants did not object to the filing of the
counterclaim and the Reply thereto which framed new
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issues completely outside the matters discussed in the
pre-trial conference, then he certainly cannot be heard
now to complain that the evidence on those issues so
framed should not have been admitted as being outside
the issues framed in the pre-trial conference. One is
contemplated to intend the consequences of his own
acts and counsel for appellants should not be permitted
to assail the trial court for alleged failings which, if
they exist at all, were of appellants' counsel's own making.
POINT II.
A WRITTEN CONTRACT MAY BE REFORMED BY THE
COURT TO EXPRESS THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES WHEN THE CONTRACT AS WRITTEN CONTAINS A MISTAKE IN EXPRESSION \VHICH IS MUTUAL
TO THE PARTIES.

Point I of appellants' brief does not squarely raise
the issue before this court. Appellant's assign as error
in Point I of their brief the trial court's having permitted plaintiffs to vary the terms of a written contract by
parole evidence. This begs the question. The real question before the court is did the trial court have the
right and the power to reform a written instrument
signed by the parties, in order to correct an error incorporated therein~ If it did have such power, then the
violation of the parole evidence rule is not error.
In the ease of Sine vs. Harper, Utah, 222 P. 2d 571,
this court expressly recognized the power of the trial
court in a proper case to undertake such a reformation,
and stated that the resulting invasion of the parole
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eYidence rule was a necessary incident to the exercise
of that power.
"Appellant is in error in her contention that
testimony concerning the rnistake was inadmissible because it varied the tenns of a written
contract. If such a contention could be sustained
then the equitable theory of refonnation of contracts would not apply to written instruments.
The right to reform is given, at least in part,
so as to n1ake the written instrument exp1ess
the bargain the parties previously orally agreed
upon. \Yhen a writing is reformed the result is
that an oral agreernent is by court decree made
legally effectiYe although at variance with the
writings which the parties had agreed upon as a
memorial of their bargain. The principle itself
modified the parol evidence rule."
The court continues by citing with approval lhe
following:
"\Villiston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 5,
Sec. 1552, states the rule as follows : 'The right
of reformation wherever allowed is necessarily ·
an invasion or limitation of the parol evidence
rule, since when equity reforms a writing it
enforces an oral agreement at variance with the
writing which the parties had agreed upon as a
rnemorial of their bargain. This limitation is
necessary to work justice, and there seems no
more reason to object to it in case of reformation than in case of recission for fraud or for
rnistake. In either case, unless the mistake precludes the existence of a contract at law, it should
not be denied that the writing correctly states the
actual contract or conveyance which has been
made, but since it is inequitable to allow the
enforcernent of it, and since justice requires sub-
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stitution of another in its place, equity gives
relief where reformation is appropriate, and to
that end necessarily admits any relevant parol
evidence." Sime vs. Harper, supra.
That the cou~ts of this state have inherent power
to reform a written instrument is so well established
that we need only cite a few of the decisions of this
court to that effect.
"Mutual mistakes can be corrected and courts
will reform a contract so as to express what the
parties actually agreed upon and make it express
the terms upon which the minds of both parties
met. The law on the subject is well established
in this jurisdiction. If the same mistake be made
by both parties, the contract may be rectified, but
the proof must be clear and distinct, as the courts
do not inake contracts for parties. To secure
reformation of a written contract which is presumed to be the real contract and to contain all
the terms agreed upon, the party seeking relief
and demanding reformation of the contract must
establish the mutual mistake by evidence that is
clear, satisfactory, and convincing, and not merely by a preponderance of the evidence. Wherrit't
v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 Pac. 534; Weight v.
Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899 ; Deseret National
Bank v. Dinwoodey et al., 17 Utah 43, 53 P.
215; Ewing v. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 52 P. 4.
The only question involved in this case is whether
the proof produced by appellants, considered in
connection with that offered by respondents,
measures up to the required standard. The
answer to this question necessitates a review of
the testimony." Cram vs. Reynolds, et al., 55
Utah 384, 186 P. 100.
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Just as in the case ei ted above, the court in the
instant ease is confronted with the necessity to review
the testilnony. The law is clear, if the respondents' by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence established
the mutual mistake in the written agreernent, then respondents were entitled to have the court reform that
agreenrent and to make the agreement conform to the
actual agreernen t of the parties. Let us then examine
the proof.
Arnold Paulsen, the respondent who conducted the
entire course of dealing on behalf of Paulsen Brothers
Construction Co. with ~Ir. and ~Irs. Coombs, testified
that he ·was asked by Mr. Coombs to bid upon the cost
of carpenter labor in erecting a house according to. a
set of plans, a copy of which plans were submitted to
hiin by ~Ir. Coombs and which Mr. Paulsen identified
from the stand as Exhibit "B." Mr. Paulsen further
testified that this bid was not to include any materials,
that it was to be only for the performance of the carpenter labor required (R. 39, 40, 42). He testified that
he did submit such a bid to Mr. Coombs and that he
bid the sum of $5,500.00 for the performance of the
carpenter labor required in the construction of the
house, but was asked not to bid on the swimming pool
(R. 53). In response to a question, Mr. Paulsen testified
as follows:
"A. It included all structural carpenter labor,
and finished carpenter labor, both interior
and exterior.

"Q.

Who was to furnish the

"A.

Mr. Coombs.

material~
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"Q.

Did he so state to you~

"A.

Yes." (R. 39-40).

Mr. Paulsen testified that Mr. Coombs accepted his
verbal bid and ordered him to start work, which he did
on about the 15th of October, 1950 (R. 46). In this
regard Mr. Paulsen's testimony is clear and unequivocal.

"Q.

I refer again to the file, Exhibit A, and call
your attention to the fact that this contract,
which I believe you stated was the one you
entered into, or which has been admitted
by the defendants, is dated November 3, 1950
-did you execute this contract after you
commenced the job~

"A.

Yes. We had done a little work on it before
the contract was entered into.

"Q.

This work was started on the strength of
this bid~

"A.

That is correct.

"Q.

And that bid did not contain any items of
material~

''A.

No." (R. 46).

Mr. Paulsen further testified that he made a little
memorandum of the bid on a slip of paper which he
turned over to the architect for Mr. Coombs, one LeRoy
W. Johnson (R. 41). Mr. Paulsen testified that subsequent to the commencement of the work under the bid
refeTred to above, he was called upon to sign the written agreement, Exhibit "A," and his testimony in this
regard is as follows:

"Q.

Did you, yourself, or anyone in your employ,
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prepare this typewritten agreement' (Reference is to exhibit "A").
"A.

No.

"Q.

Do you know who did prepare it'

''A.

No, I don't.

"Q.

When did you first see the agreement Y

"A.

In

"Q.

At that time did you then execute the same
with your signature'

"'A.

Yes.

"Q.

So that the date would be fixed November 3,
1950, by the contract date; it that correct'

"A.

That is correct.

~Ir.

Coomb's office.

"'Q. At that time did you and Mr. Coombs have
any discussion with respect to supplying materials on the job Y
"A.

No.

"Q. Was there any change intimated to you by
Mr. Coombs, with respect to your previous
request when you made your bid'
"A.

No, the·re wasn't.

"Q.

Did you, at the time, N ovembe·r 3, 1950,
understand you were to furnish materials
on the job'

"A.

No. I had the understanding it was labor
only." (R. 42).

In contrast to the clear and unequivocal testimony
of Mr. Paulsen on the submission of his bid for car-
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penter labor only, its acceptance by Mr. Coombs and the
commencement of work on the basis of their verbal
understanding, the court is requested to consider the
testimony by Mr. Coombs at pages 132 through page
136 of the record. Mr. Coombs evaded questions and
even argued with counsel to the extent that it became
necessary for the court to admonish Mr. Coombs to
answer the questions and not to argue with counsel
(R. 135). Mr. Coombs knew that he had not asked
Arnold Paulsen to include any materials in his verbal
bid. That the contract as ·written did not contain the
true agreement of the parties is well shown, we believe,
by the following exchange between counsel and ~fr.
Coombs appearing at page 133 of the record; the specific
examination was with regard to the material employed
in the kitchen cabinets :

"Q.

"A.

I will also call your attention to the verbiage,
~1r. Coombs and ask you if it says anything
in there about ste·el cabinets, at any point?
No.

"Q.

Does it say any type of material~

"A.

It says he will furnish cabinets in the kitchen.

"Q.

I have asked you, does it say any type of
material at all~

"A.

They can

"Q.

Answer 'yes' or 'no.'

"A.

No.

"Q.

It doesn't does

"A.

No.

be~

it~
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specifica~

"Q.

Did yon eyer give a eopy of these
tions to .Mr. Paulsen~

.. A.

Yes sir, I did.

··Q.

\Yhen did you do that~

··A.

At the time we signed the contract.

"Q.

At the tin1e you signed the contract1

··~~-

Yes, sir.

"Q.

You didn't give them to him at the time you
asked him to bid on the job did you 1

"A.

It is up to him when he makes a bid to get
them himself.

••Q.

You did not furnish them to him 1

.. A.

I have them in the office.

"Q.

You didn't give them to him until after the
contract was signed~

.. A.

At the time the contract was signed, Arnold
said the specifications didn't mean much, just
turned them over.

"Q.

They don't, if you are not furnishing material, do they~

"A.

He should read his own contract, Mr. Tibbals.

"Q.

I am not arguing whether he should or
shouldn't read the contract Mr. Coombs, I am
asking whether he was ever requested to
furnish material1

"A.

In his contract1

"Q.

Not until the contract was signed1

"A.

I went over the contract minutely. I said,
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'Have you read this thing~' He said, 'Yes.'
And signed it." (R. 133-134).
When opposed to the clear cut testimony of Mr.
Paulsen, it becomes apparent that this testimony of Mr.
Coombs is the testimony of a man who is trying to e:vade
an issue. The truth is, Mr. Coombs did not intend that
the contract should cover materials. Let us see what
he has to say as to the manner in which the material
for the job was supplied. Mr. Coombs testified that
he changed his plans as to materials used at will, obtained bids from mills on various items· for the house,
and all without one word of consultation with Arnold
Paulsen or any other representative of the Paulsen
Brothers (R. 123, 132).

"Q. You felt perfectly free to get bids without
conferring with Mr. Paulsen~
"A.

That is true, I did get bids without conferring with Mr. Paulsen.

"Q.

Did you at any time ask Mr. Paulsen if he
was going to build the cabinets before you
got the bids~

"A.

I didn't want them in pine, discussed building them in pine, he was going to build them
in pine, I wanted them built in birch, I wanted
to get bids for birch.

"Q.

Do the plans specify the materials~

"A.

The specifications do. He read them over.

"Q.

There is no showing ·Mr. Paulsen made his
own-

"A.

Just a minute-

* * * *

·~
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"THE COlTRT: Now, I think we will g·d
along faster if the witness doesn't argue.
"THE \YITNE~~: He is getting smart
"~ith n1e.
"THE COURT: Just answer the questions
he asks. Don't argue.
""Q. (By :.Mr. Tibbals) Now, 1lr. Coombs, what
you did was to verbally go into a contract
with :Jir. Paulsen, without specifications or
anything else, except these plans, and you
got him started on the job~
··A.

Yes, he agreed to do that." (R. 135-136).

\Y e submit that this course of conduct by Mr. Coontbs
does not comport with his contention that Paulsen was
to supply the materials under the contract. Furthermore, Coombs bought and paid for the materials himself
and he so testified (R. 125). Mr. Coombs did not at any
time prior to the commencement of this controversy,
long after the job was completed, ever think for one
minute that Paulsen was to supply material. His conduct is exactly that of a man who made a contract for
labor and was to supply the material himself.
Mr. Coombs further testified that he employed
LeRoy Johnson, architect, as the supervisor to handle
the job for him and paid him 2% of the contract price
for his services (R.134).
An architect employed to supervise is considered
the agent of the owner by whom he is employed.
"As a general rule, it may be said that as
far as the preparation of plans is concerned, an
architect aets as an independent contractor, but
that so far as regards the performance of his

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supervisory function .with respect to a building
under construction he ordinarily acts as the agent
and representative of the person for whom the
work is being done." 3 Am. Jur., Architects, P.
1000, Sec. 5.
Mr. Johnson's testimony on the preparation of the
contract and upon the understanding had between Paulsen and Coombs is most enlightening, and it should be
borne in mind that Mr. Johnson was the agent of Mr.
Coombs. Mr. Johnson testified as .follows:

"Q.

Mr. Johnson, with respect to the contract
which I .just showed to you, do you know
where that was prepared, to your own knowledge~ [Reference was to exhi·bit "A"].

"A.

The carpenter, the sub-contractor, Mr. Paulsen, brought a roughly drafted contractual
agreement to my office, and requested that it
be typed up for signature by himself and
Mr. Coombs.

"Q.

Was this typed then in your

"A.

It was.

"Q.

By

"A.

It was typed by the stenographer.

office~

whom~

"Q. · I call your attention specifically, Mr. Johnson, to Paragraph 6 of that contract, will
you read that, please~
"A.

Uh, huh. (Examines contract). All right.

"Q.

Now, with respect to that paragraph, Mr.
Johnson, do you know of your own knowledge
whether the bid which you referred to, that
was brought in in rough draft contained the
language which appears in P~ragraph 6 ~
26
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"A. It did not contain the language as appears
in Paragraph 6.

··MR. HANSON: Just a nwn1ent, your
Honor. \Y e will object to that and move to strike
it, on the ground you cannot vary the terms of
a eontraet by parol evidence.
"THE COURT:

The objection is overruled .

.. MR. TIBBALS: You
question, 1\lr. Johnson ..
"A.

may

answer

the

It was not the form of the contract, and the
document by 1\tfr. Paulsen was not worded in
this manner.

''Q. Do you know of your own knowledge where
the verbiage-and I refer specifically to the
item:
•• "l\Iillwork under this contract specifically
includes and covers the furnishing and installation of the following cabinet work, all cabinet
work shown on plans in the following roonts:
Planting box in dining room, cabinets in kitchen
and day room, storage cabinets above laundry
equipment in utility room, shelving and hook
strips in all wardrobe closets in bedrooms, shelving for linen cabinets, bookcases in den, lavatory counters in bath and shower rooms ready
for tile, counter tops by others. Five sets of
fruit storage shelves in storage room. Shelving
in broom closet off the day room. The above
named items of millwork are to be mill built or
equal as acceptable to the archi·tect, and all labor
and materials for these items and their installation are to be furnished by this contractor
according to the terms of this agreement.'
"Do you know where that verbiage originated'
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"A.

Very likely by virtue of the fact that the
stenographer in practice was used to typing
all specifications and contracts from the reference to labor and materials as a tied-together phrase, as a common phrase.

"Q.

Is that a phrase which appears in your generally accepted Architect Institute forms~

"A.

It appears in the standard forms of the
specifications, the general condition as prepared in the American Institute of Architects.

"Q.

Do you know of your own knowledge whether Mr. Paulsen was asked to bid on materials for this job~

"A. No.
"Q. You do not know~
"A.

I will rephrase it. I know he was not asked
to bid on materials.

"Q. You know he was not asked to bid on materials~

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

Do you know of your own knowledge, whether Mr. Paulsen furnished materials for this
contract~

"A. No, Mr. Paulsen did not furnish materials."
(R. 69-71).
We submit to this honorable court that the respondents sustained in the court below the burden impos~d
upon them in asking for reformation of the contract
to exclude the word "materials" from paragraph 6 thereof. The respondents proved by absolutely clear and
uncontroverted evidence that they made a bid for doing
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carpenter labor only and that this bid wa~ in the amount
of $5,500.00. lt was ad1nitted that work wa~ ordered
conunenced, and did actually com1nence, on the strength
of this bid, thereby constituting an acceptance of the
bid by ~Ir. Comnbs and forn1ing a binding agreement
between the parties. We have shown that the word "materials" was inserted in the written agreement, which
was signed by the parties some three weeks after the
work commenced, by a scrivener in the employ of the
architect. 'ye have shown that the conduct of the parties
confirmed the fact that the understanding was that Paulsen Brothers Construction Co. would perform the carpenter labor and Coombs would furnish the materials.
As further evidence of the fact that respondents carried this burden succ~ssfully in the lower court, we submit that the lower court, the trier of the fact, who heard
the testimony of the witnesses, who examined the evidence, found that the respondents were entitled to a
reformation of the contract to exclude the word "materials" therefrom. We believe the lower court should be
sustained in this finding.
Some effort is made by appellants to indicate that
the pleading by the respondents in the court below was
not sufficient to place the issue of reformation before the
court for consideration. We submit that under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs reply filed in the
court below adequately states the grounds for reformation of the contract on the basis of mutual mistake. The
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule "8" provides:
"A pleading which

~ets

forth a claim for
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relief, whether an or.iginal claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim,
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which
he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded."
It is submitted that respondents met this requirement.
Appellants in their brief confuse the matter of
reformation of the contract with respect to the matter
of the "materials" and the question of whether or not
the swimming pool was ever included in the contract.
Mr. Paulsen stated he did not bid on the swimming pool
(R. 60). The contract written or oral never made any
mention of the swimming pool (R. 6 and 7). The architect testified tha:t Mr. Paulsen was not asked to bid on
the swimming pool, that the swimming pool was not
going to be built at tha:t time by Mr. Coombs (R. 72, 78).
Only Mr. Coombs ever testified to the contrary and when
asked in regard to the matter he te-stified that the swimming pool was in the plans but he netrer at any time
testified that Mr. Paulsen was asked to bid thereon (R.
115). Only by a gross stretch of the word "residence"
to make it include a swimming pool could it be said that
Paulsen ever bid on a swimming pool for Mr. Coombs.
Mr. Johnson, the architect, ·testified that the swimming
pool was a separate item from the residence and that
estimates and bids would be separately itemized (R. 81).
Mr. Johnson, architeet and agent for the owner Mr.
Coombs, further testified that there was not anything
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m connection with ~lr. Paulsen's bid or the contract
which was ultunately signed that would indicate construction of a swinnning pool was included as a part
thereof ~R. 88).
The fact is that as has been stated the swiimning
pool was siinply never included in the contract. The
burden of proof lay on the appellants in the lower court
to show that the swimming pool was included in the
contract, and this was an issue of fact, not of law. The
evidence, until the testiinony of Coombs, was so clear
that Paulsen had not been asked to bid on the swimming
pool and that it was not included in the contract, that
the appellants' attorney withdrew his questions with
regard to it (R. 106). Not until Mr. Coombs testified
did there come any issue with respect to the swimming
pool. Again, .the trial court, trier of the fact and sole
and exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses,
after having heard the testimony and examined the evidence, found in favor of the respondents on this issue
by finding that the work included in the contract was
completed without the swiinming pool.
Appellants further confuse the issue by trying to
make it appear that respondents are seeking to reform
the contract with respect to certain o;ther items consisting of a redwood fence and certain partitions in a bath
house which was to be part of the garage. It was testified the redwood fence was never built and neither were
the partitions in the bath house (R. 80). The appellants
claim a credit for the amount which was included in the
original bid of Mr. Paulsen to cover these items which
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were not built. Mr .. Paulsen testified that Mr. Coombs
had been given credit for these items as offset against
certain additional work done by Paulsen for which no
charge was ever made to Coombs (R. 44). That this
offset was approved as fair and equitable is testified
to by the fact that Mr. Johnson, architect and agent for
Coombs, stated the job was completed with the exception
of an item of finish hardware whieh Coombs had never
furnished to be installed (R. 73, 74). The testimony
in this regard is not only clear, it is uncontroverted. .
Since no reformation of the contract is either sought
by respondents, or necessary, in regard to these items,
the respondents are not . held to the rule of evidence
which the appellants seek to apply to respondents in
their brief in discussing this matter. In the absence of
some showing of a complete failure of the evidence to
comport with the Findings of the Court, the appellate
court will nnt interfere with the Findings· made by the
Trial Court.
"When dealing with findings of fact made hy
the trial court, the question for the appellate court
is whether there was any evidence to sustain the
conclusion reached by the court below. A finding
of fact by the court below canno·t be rejected on
appeal where there was sufficient evidence to
sustain it, where it is not contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, where it cannot be
said there was no warrant for the finding, or
where there is room for reasonable minds to
differ as to the facts. As the rule is laid down
by many courts, findings of the trial court which
are supported or sustained by competent evidence
are binding upon the appellate court and cannot

32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or will not be interfered with or di~ttubed by
-that eourt even though the evidence is conflicting. The evidence 1nu~t he elparly against the
finding~ in order to ju~tify a n•versal." 3 Ainerican Juri~prudence-Appeal and Error-Sec. 900,
P. 464-6.
Also see Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394,
290 P. 169, wherein this court held that if a finding of
the trial court is based upon sufficient evidence, this
court is powerless to interfere with it even if it were
disposed to do so.
Though the reformation of the contract is a matter
lying within equity, the other Inatters urged by the
appellants ·which are outside of the scope of the problem
of reformation should not be permitted to serve as a
basis for setting aside the findings of fact in the lower
court on a matter which otherwise would only be reviewable on the law. An action to recover the contract price
is normally considered to be an action at law. Therefore, simply because the equity jurisdiction of the court
is invoked to reform the contract on the matter of the
inclusion of the word "materials" in paragraph 6 of the
contract, does not bring the matter of the remaining
items requiring an interpretation at law of the contract
before this court in such a manner that this court has
jurisdiction to review the facts as found by the Trial
Court on· those matters not relating to the problem in
equity. The Utah Code provides at Title 20-2-2, U.C.A.
1943,

"* * * In equity cases the appeal may be on
questions of both law and fact; in cases at law
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the appeal shall be on questions of law alone."
No attempt is made by appellants to set forth questions on appeal on any issues at law under the contract,
and appellants should not be permitted by this court
to so enlarge the matter of reformation of the contract
as to subject the decision of the lower court to review
by this court on issues of fact not relating to the refor~
mation of the contract.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE
CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS AS AN EXHIBIT.

Appellants urge that the lower court should have
admitted the construction specifications as an exhibit
and that the exclusion of these specifications was an
error. Mr. Pauls~n testified that he never did see the
construction specifications (R. 50). Mr. Coombs himself
admitted he did not give Mr. Paulsen the specifications
until the contract was signed and that he did not give
them to him at the time that he solicited Mr. Paulsen
to bid on the carpenter labor (R. 133). The architect,
l\1r. Johnson, testified that he never gave a set of the
specifications to Mr. Paulsen (R. 72). In view of these
facts which were never controverted, the specifications
could hardly have been considered as material or relevant to determination of the issues in this case and were
correctly excluded.
POINT IV.
A PARTY TO A CONTRACT CANNOT AT ONE AND
THE SAME TIME CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE CONTRACT AND THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE SAME IN-
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SOFAR AS IT BENEFITS Hil\I AND CHOOSES TO IGNORE
THE CONTRACT INSOFAR AS IT LIMl 'rS HIM, OR BINDS
HIM.

Appellants seek to compel the respondents to live
up to the terms of Exhibit "A," but hold then1selves as in
no way bound by its provisions. The ridiculousness of
the position assumed by appellants becomes apparent
in considering just one item under the contract. It is
appellants' position that Paulsen Brothers were required
to furnish carpenter labor and materials under the item
6 of the exhibit referred to above. Having entered into
a contract whereby Paulsens were to do this work, then
can ~Ir. Coombs ignore the contract and purchase the
items to be built and furnished by Paulsen Brothers
from others and incur no penalty under the contract~
If so, then there is a failure of consideration under
the contract and the contract is void. Let us consider
the steel kitchen cabinets which :Mr. Coombs testified
he had at all times contemplated under the contract
(R. 132). :Mr. Coombs would have us believe that when
Paulsen had contracted to build the kitchen cabinets to
a standard of "mill built or equivalent" that nevertheless he, Mr. Coombs, could purchase steel cabinets without even conferring with Paulsen and then simply deduct
the cost of the steel cabinets from the amount of Mr.
Paulsen's contract. To carry this to its ridiculous extreme. Suppose Mr. Coombs had decided to have the
kitchen cabinets made of platinum, would. he have then
been entitled to charge Mr. Paulsen $10,090.00 for the
cost thereof, because Mr. Paulsen had agreed to furnish
kitchen cabinets mill built or equivalent~ Mr. Coombs
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is bound as much by the agreement as Mr. Paulsen.
Mr. Paulsen agreed to furnish the labor to provide kitchen cabinets mill built or equivalent, if Mr. Coombs
chose after entering into the contract to go elsewhere
and purchase cabinets of another sort he will nevertheless have to pay Mr. Paulsen the contract price,
and with no deduction. One party to a contract cannot
at will change the contract without there being a meeting
of the minds and a new consideration to support the
new contract. American Juris prudence has this to tsay
on the questions of mutuality:
"In many judicial decisions there may be
found language to the effect that in order that
a contract may be enforceable there must be
mutuality. It has even been said that a contract
implies mutual obligations. If by mutuality of
obligation is 1neant, as some courts have suggested, that there must be an undertaking on one
side and a consideration on the other, the necessity for its existence cannot be questioned. But
if, as other courts have said, mutuality of obligation means that a contract 1nust be binding
on both parties, so that an action can be maintained by each against the other, the statement
that mutuality of obligation is essential to every
contract is too broad. vVhatever the rule may be
with respect to the specific enforcement of contracts, there can be no doubt that if a contract
is ever unenforceable in other wavs because of
the lack of mutuality, it is becaus~ such lack of
mutuality creates a want of consideration. * * •
Consideration is essential; mutuality of obligation is not unless the want of n1utuality would
leave one party without a valid or available
1
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:

eon~ideration for his promi~e. The doctrine of
n1utuality of obligation thPrPfore appears to be
merely another n10de of ~ta ting- the rule of consideration that where therp i~ no other consideration for a contract, the m:t!uul ]Jromises must be
binding on both partie·.·, for the reason that only
a binding promise is sufficient consideration for a
pr01nise of the other party." 1:2 A1n. J ur. "Contracts," p. 509-11-8ec. 13. (Italics ours).

In the instant case we believe that this contract was
as binding upon :Jlr. Combs as upon Paulsen Brothers,
and that he could not, after having accepted their bid
for the carpenter labor, then single handedly and wi1:hout consultation, as he admitted from the stand he did
(R. 135), solicit other bids for the supplying of work
which Paulsen Brothers contracted to supply, make
purchases on the strength of these new bids, and then
expect Paulsen Brothers to give him credit against the
original contract for the purchases so made.
"However, no abrogation, change, modification, or substitution in a primary contract can
be effected by the sole action of one of the parties
to it. The consent of both is required to cancel,
alter, or supplant a contract fairly made. The
same n1eeting of the minds is needed that was
necessary to make the contract in the first place."
12 Am. J ur. "Contract:-:," p. 983, Sec. 405.
We therefore submit, that the items for which Mr.
Coombs claims credit under the contract would, if allowed, constitute the modification and alteration of the contract in violation of the law .of contract, and specifically
we refer to the cost of the steel kitchen cabinets, the cost
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of the birch planter box, the cabinets for the stud).
If the court were to permit this alteration of the contract by Mr. Coombs without even so much as consultation with Mr. Paulsen, it would indeed result in a situation, to quote from the conclusion of the appellants'
brief, where "The sanctity of the written agreement,
which heretofore has only been modified upon the clearest and most convincing kind of proof, would disappear
and the advantage be given to those who seek to avoid
their solemn obligations." Mr. Coombs never at any time
showed any waiver by Paulsen of his right to be paid
for the items to be furnished under the contract. Mr.
Paulsen is in all events entitled to receive payment for
his labor which he contracted to furnish. If Coombs did
not use the labor he contracted for, that is his loss, not
Paulsen Brothers', and he should not be permitted by
this court to shift the loss to Paulsen Brothers.
POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT.

Appellants have not either in the lower court, or
upon this appeal, ever been willing to recognize the plaintiffs' theory of this case or to deal with it in the form
presented by the plaintiffs. Their policy has been
throughout the case to work on their own sep~rate
theory of the case and not to respond to the theory
advanced by the plaintiffs. So it is, in the appellants'
discussion of the evidence under their Point IV "The
.
'
. Judgment Is Contrary To The Evidence," as set forth
in their brief.
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Plaintiff::; and respondents have advaneed only one
theory of this case from the beginning. Namely that
Paulsen Brothers Construction Cmnpany entered into a
contract to furnish carpenter labor in the construction
of a residence for Coon1bs. That this contract was formed on the basis of a verbal understanding. That in reducing the verbal understanding to writing an error
occurred which neither of the parties observed, namely
that in paragraph 6 of the agreement the word "materials" was included when it should not have been. That
subject to this one necessary reformation the contract
has been performed as agreed upon. That certain substitutions were made with the approval of the architect,
namely the ceiling was firred down in the living room,
dining room and hallway to accommodate a change made
after the bid was entered in the heating plans (R. 44),
and put in some panelling in the west end of the bedrooms which was not called for when the bid was su~
mitted. That no charge was made for the extra work
thus entailed but it was used, with the architect's approval, as an offset to the cost of the labor in installing
the shower partitions and the redwood fence which were
not built though included in the original bid and the
plans (R. 44). The architect testified the job was completed except for one item of finish hardware the estimated cost of installation of which was around $10.00
:--,, (R. 69, 73, 74). It was testified that the Paulsen Broth- - ers had at all- times stood ready to install this hardware
.- but that it had never been furnished by Coombs, and
that Mr. Paulsen had gone on several occasions to install
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the same but that the hardware was not available (R. 61,
62). It is recognized in the law of contract that one party
to the contract cannot by his own failure, which thereby
prevents the other party's performance, avoid liability
under the contract because of the failure to perform
resulting from his own fault.
"It is sometimes said that an offer to perforn1 is equivalent to performance or that an
offer to perform or do an act which is prevented
by the party in whose favor performance is to be
made, is equivalent to performance." 12 Am. Jur.
"Contracts," Sec. 335, P. 892.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that even
the architect's estimate of the portion of the contract
not performed was only $10.00. Certainly, therefore,
the proof is conclusive that the contract was performed
by Paulsen Brothers. It was admitted by the defendants
that payment of the final payment due to Paulsen Brothers under the contract in the sum of $1,375.00 had not
been made, and that payment for the extras in the
amount of $185.00 had not been made, though the extras
were admitted to have been performed (R. 30). We submit that a review of the entire record does not reflect
one scintilla of evidence to the contrary.
The defendants, however, refuse to recognize or
deal with this theory of the case whatever and refuse
to recognize the situation as it exists. Defendants try to
show a state of facts that never did exist and which was
never contemplated by the parties. The defendants take
the matter of the redwood fence and the matter of the
shower partitions and simply brush aside the fact that
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the substitution of the work needed in the eon~truction
of these itents was elsewhere applied with the approval
of the arehitect who \Yas the agent of Comnbs. 'L'hey <say
that these items were not built and therefore l\lr. Coombs
should have credit for them. By so doing, they disavow
the approval of the architect to the substitution made.
If then they so do, they n1ust pay for the extra labor
performed in the items substituted. The picture is as
broad as it is long. ~Ir. Coombs is not entitled to be
unjustly enriched by disavowing the act of the architect
in permitting the substitution of the one labor for the
other, and then refusing to pay for either the labor called
for or the labor substituted.

The matter of the swimming pool has been elsewhere
treated at length. Suffice it to say that the testimony
was conclusive that l\Ir. Paulsen never bid on the swimming pool. That he never contracted to do any work
on the swimming pool. This was testified to by Mr.
Paulsen, and :Jir. Johnson, the architect (R. 53, 60, 78).
Mr. Coombs evaded the question by saying the swimming
pool was in the plans, but he never did say that Paulsen
submitted a bid or agreed to build the swimming pool
(R. 89). The written contract makes no mention of the
swimming pool (R. 6 and 7). One of the theories by
which the defendants seek to have an offset made against
respondents for the amount of the cost of the swimming
~:
..... pool carpentry is so novel as to merit passing reference.
~·"" At page 22 of their brief they refer to a conversation
rl!J between Coombs and the archi teet Mr. Johnson, wherein
l\1r. Johnson said that Coombs ·would save between

J"...-
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$350.00 and $400.00 by not building the .swiJnming pool,
that this was the value of the carpenter labor. Mr.
Paulsen was not a party to the conversation, had nothing
to do with it, yet defendants and appellants seek to bind
responp.ents to the architect's estimate of a saving which
would be made by not· building the swimming pool, and
to deduct this from a contract which did not in the first
instance include any amount for the labor involved in
constructing the swimming pool.
A great show is made by appellants in their brief
of the supposed concessions made by the respondents'
counsel as to the value of the labor and materials on certain items. Counsel for appellants completely ignore
the statement of counsel for respondents setting forth
the condition upon which the concession was made,
namely that the court not hold with the respondents
on their interpretation of the contract (R. 33). The
fact is that the court did hold with respondents on the
interpretation of the contract. Further, the appellants
did not. at any time ever accept or agree to be bound
by the figures set forth by the counsel for respondents.
On the contrary appellants insisted upon an interpretation of the contract which has heretofore been discussed
at great length in this brief, an interpretation which the
lower court found untenable.
The issue raised by the appellants on the quailty
of the workmanship is such an . obviously desperate
attempt to find some means by which to avoid the payment of the sum justly due to Paulsen Brothers that
it is doubtful whether it should be dignified by an attempt
to reply to it.
42
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.-:

The ti.r~t allegation hy appellants of a basis of a
claim for danmges is that Paulsen Brothers incorrectly
installed the windows. The supervising architect admitted there was nothing wrong with the way the windows
were installed, that he himself had been on the job after
the windo,vs were in place but before it became impossible to change then1 without n1ajor reconstruction, but
that he never noticed anything wrong, and that the
change desired by Coombs was for aesthetic reasons
having nothing to do with the function ~f the windows
(R. 88).
The second item on which damage is claimed is with
respect to a steel sliding door. The only thing Paulsen
Brothers were required to do by the contract with
Coombs in respect to this door was to frame the opening.
This was done in accordance with the architect's instructions, and he so testified. The door did not operat~
properly because of a failure in the equipment supplied with the door, and this equipment had to he
changed, but the failure had not one thing to do with
Paulsen or the contract which he had with Coombs
(R. 89).

The third item is a matter of. the hardwood floors.
The testinwny in this regard by the supposed expert
who appeared for the defendants was nothing short of
/ pitiful. He admitted he was never on the job during
.. construction, that he never examined how the floors
were nailed, that the material was an inferior grade,
J'il that he never examined the subflooring, but that the
~1 floors were loose and that this was of necessity the fault
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of Paulsen Brothers Construction Company because
the floors were not nailed properly-and this when he
admitted he didn't know how they were nailed (R. 100,
101). The evasive shifty testimony of this witness is
what the court was asked to consider as overcoming
the testimony of the architect and of Mr. Paulsen that
the floors were correctly laid (R. 89, 90, 140).
CONCLUSION
This case can be characterized in brief as the classic
situation of wanting the best, but not wanting to pay for
the best. Mr. Coombs planned to build this large home,
with a swi~ming pool, and all of the elegance that goes
with it, but he didn't want to pay for it when the hills
came in. In a frantic attempt to avoid paying the debt
due to Paulsen Brothers, Mr. Coombs first took advantage of an error which he discovered in the contract that
he had signed with Mr. Arnold Paulsen, an error of
which neither of the parties were aware at the ·time of
signing the contract, namely that the scrivener had
mistakenly included "materials" in clause 6 of the contract where it was never to have been included. Apparently feeling himself insecure on this ground of avoiding
the obligation, he· later added another possible means of
evasion. As late as the pre-trial conference he had not
thought up a counterclaim for damages as a means of
counteracting his justly incurred liability to Paulsen
Brothers, but when he did think of it, his counsel
changed the ·entire theory of the case and filed a counterclaim 'for damages. The only difficulty has been, that
44
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~Ir.

Co01nbs could not sustain the burden of proof on his
counterclalin, and the plaintiffs could and did sustain
the burden of proof on their complaint and reply. The
trial court recognized this fact after having heard the
testin1ony of all the witnesses and examining all the
evidence and accordingly awarded judgment to the plaintiffs.
The debt owed by the Coombs to Paulsen Brothers
is an honest debt, fairly contracted. The Coombs have
received full value for every dollar due on the debt.
The debt should have been paid long ago. The decision
of the lower court is sound and just, and we urge that
this court recognize that fact and lend its power and
strength in support of the cause of right and justice
by sustaining the decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
by ALLEN H. TIBBALS
EARL P. STATEN
Attorneys for Respondents.

45
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

